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The Curious Case of Werner Weinhold: Escape,
Death, and Contested Legitimacy at the
German-German Border
Pertti Ahonen
IN the early morning hours of December 19, 1975, a shooting incident tookplace at the inter-German border, on the boundary line between Thuringiaand Bavaria, near the East German town of Hildburghausen. According to
West German border guards on duty at the time, the moonlit calm of a cold
and clear winter night was disrupted around 2:25 a.m. by the sound of subma-
chine-gun fire from the eastern side of the boundary. During the next hours
plenty of additional commotion ensued on East German territory: border soldiers
combed the terrain behind the border; officers drove around directing the pro-
ceedings; helicopters buzzed overhead. Based on their observation of similar
past incidents, West German authorities quickly deduced what had probably
taken place: an attempted escape across the heavily fortified German-German
border. The main variables not known at the time were whether the attempt
had been successful and whether anyone had been hurt.1
Answers to both these questions also soon emerged. Reports spread of two
deaths on the East German side, while a young man whose strong accent
marked him as a native of the GDR region of Saxony hitchhiked his way ever
deeper into West Germany in the gray December dawn. Obviously shaken,
with soiled clothes and jittery hands, he told an initially skeptical motorist that
he had just run across the border in a dramatic nocturnal escape. Eventually,
the young man—whose name was Werner Weinhold—headed up to Marl, a
small town near Essen, where he hoped to find shelter and initial assistance for
his new life in the Federal Republic with relatives who resided in the area.2
I would like to thank the following people for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article:
this journal’s editor and anonymous reviewers, Peter Michell, Louise Settle, Thomas Maulucci, and
my fellow panel members at the German Studies Association conference in Milwaukee in
September 2005.
1“Auszugsweise Abschrift der Grenzlage der ZiB vom 20.12.1975,” “Niederschrift aufgenommen
am 29.12.1975 in Geschäftszimmer des ZKcm G Coburg,” both in Zentrale Beweismittel- und
Dokumentationsstelle, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Braunschweig (hereafter ZBDoSt): AR-ZE 30/76.
2Bayerische Grenzpolizei, Coburg, “Vernehmungsniederschrift” of Manfred K., December 22,
1975, ZBDoSt: AR-ZE 30/76; “Zwei Tote auf dem Weg nach Westen,” Stern, no. 26 (1976).
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In the days and weeks that followed, this particular incident assumed consider-
able public prominence, which was to persist for several years. During this period,
the so-called “Weinhold case” (“Fall Weinhold”) provoked prolonged and heated
legal battles, partly within the Federal Republic but particularly between the two
Germanies. More significantly, it also became a profoundly politicized issue, again
especially across the German east-west divide. It underscored the contradictory
challenges of conflict and cooperation that the GDR and the Federal Republic
faced in the détente-imbued context of the mid-to-late 1970s, particularly by
highlighting the continued significance of the inter-German border for the
ongoing Cold-War contest between the two Germanies over the most funda-
mental asset necessary for these bitter rivals, as indeed for any state: political
legitimacy.3
At first, the border incident of December 19, 1975, appeared unlikely to
achieve such far-reaching notoriety, however. On the contrary, on the western
side of the border at least, the events of that wintry night initially seemed to
conform to well-established patterns that had by then become almost routine.
Violent incidents at the German-German border had been regular occurrences
for nearly three decades, and they remained so in the mid-1970s, too, even if
their frequency had declined with the GDR’s continuing efforts to perfect its
system of preemptive border controls, aimed in large part at catching would-be
defectors well before they reached the actual frontier zone. Most such incidents
revolved around escape attempts by regular, unarmed East Germans, who came
under fire from GDR border troops or were otherwise harmed in the heavily for-
tified East German border strip on their way toward the Federal Republic. Such
cases highlighted some of the ugliest features of the East German system and, pre-
dictably, received extensive exposure in the Federal Republic’s public sphere,
often in a politicized and instrumentalized fashion, as a part of the ongoing
Cold-War rivalry between the two Germanies.
The politicized narrative about the inter-German border and its refugee
victims constructed in the Federal Republic, primarily by the country’s political
elites and mass media, emerged early, in the 1950s, but it became more pro-
nounced once the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had closed the
last major floodgate in the East German border system and made any attempt
3For other perspectives on the inter-German border and its competitive uses by the two German
states, see, for example, Edith Sheffer, “On Edge: Building the Border in East and West Germany,”
Central European History 40 (2007): 307–339; Edith Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West
Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Maren Ullrich, Geteilte
Ansichten. Erinnerungslandschaft deutsch-deutsche Grenze (Berlin: Aufbau, 2006); Astrid M. Eckert,
“‘Greetings from the Zonal Border’: Tourism to the Iron Curtain in West Germany,” Zeithistorische
Forschungen, online edition, 8 (2011), http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-
Eckert-1-2011; Pertti Ahonen, “Defending Socialism? Benito Corghi and the Inter-German
Border,” History in Focus 11 (2006), special issue on migration, http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/
Focus/Migration/articles/ahonen.html.
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to flee to the west an increasingly hazardous enterprise. The narrative’s starting
point was a denunciation of the heavily armed border as an abomination and
living proof of the depravity of communism. According to declarations issued
by the Bonn government, the very existence of this aggressively guarded,
nearly impenetrable boundary exposed the “brutal inhumanity” of the East
German system and proved that a regime compelled to “install a dividing line
of barbed wire, concrete walls, and bayonets” within the nation possessed “no
legitimacy”—in obvious contrast to the democratic polity of the Federal
Republic.4
The violence inflicted on fleeing refugees by the GDR’s border regime pro-
vided an even stronger public relations card, which the Federal Republic’s
elites consistently played to their advantage. Incidents at the boundary received
widespread coverage in West Germany’s media and political arena.
Commentators typically provided sympathetic, even heroic, portraits of East
Germans who managed to cross the border and lamented and commemorated
those shot down while trying to do so. They also portrayed escape attempts as
proof of the “hopelessness and desperation” rampant in the GDR and denounced
East Germany for violating international law and basic human rights by curtailing
the free movement of individuals and authorizing the shooting of fleeing refu-
gees.5 In addition, the standard West German narrative drew on a predictable his-
torical precedent to discredit the GDR further: the Third Reich. Particularly
during the first half of the 1960s, in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall’s construc-
tion, such comparisons flourished. According to representative public statements,
the building of the Wall had completed the transformation of eastern Germany
into “the biggest concentration camp in the world” in which “Hitler lived on”
and border guards continued the “blood-soaked practices” of the “execution
commandos of the SS and the SA.”6
By the mid-1970s, some of these the rhetorical practices had altered somewhat.
With the gradual buildup of interstate relations and other improved contacts
between the two Germanies that had evolved as a part of east-west détente,
the most aggressive accents, particularly the hard-hitting Nazi analogies, had
largely disappeared. But the broader West German narrative about the border
and its victims as proof of the inferiority and ultimate illegitimacy of East
German state socialism continued to flourish. Governmental statements stressed
4Zur Situation in der Sowjetzone nach dem 13. August 1961. Bericht und Dokumente (Bonn:
Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1961), 7; Ernst Lemmer’s foreword in Der Bau der
Mauer durch Berlin (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1986, reprint from
1961), 5.
5Zur Situation, 12.
6“Das grösste Konzentrationslager derWelt,”Die Rheinpfalz, June 16, 1962; Franz Amrehn, cited in
Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, ed., Es begann am 13. August (West Berlin: Presse- und
Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1961), 4; “Mord an der Mauer,” Kurier, August 18, 1962.
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“respect for human rights” as an essential component of détente and urged the
GDR to make its brutal border regime more “humane.”7 The mass media
struck similar notes, exemplified by an August 1975 editorial in a mainstream
regional daily, according to which “the universal declaration of human rights”
would “one day . . . prove stronger than the Wall” erected by East Berlin.8
Violent incidents at the inter-German boundary continued to be denounced
by politicians and media commentators alike, with the most vocal protests pre-
dictably resulting from deaths caused by East German border guards or by
particular anti-personnel devices, such as the land mines and automatic shooting
machines deployed in many parts of the GDR border strip.
Particular prominence in much of the commentary accrued to the so-called
Schiessbefehl, or shooting order, which supposedly regulated the behavior of
East German border guards. Since the early 1960s, West German commentators
had speculated that a central directive, issued from the top of the East German
power hierarchy, ordered border guards “to shoot indiscriminately at all refu-
gees,” as one reporter suggested in 1962.9 Such a sweeping generalization
failed to capture the reality of the secret, partly contradictory, and ambiguous
orders and instructions that actually regulated the behavior of the East German
guards. But it remained a frequently applied rhetorical tool vis-à-vis the GDR
even in the 1970s. After a deadly shooting at the Berlin Wall in early 1974, for
example, the mayor of West Berlin condemned this latest “unscrupulous appli-
cation of the inhumane Schiessbefehl” as an assault on “the policy of
détente.”10 With its portrayal of the GDR as a brutal regime whose practices
grossly violated contemporary international norms, the prevailing West
German public narrative about the inter-German boundary remained a very
useful tool for delegitimizing the GDRwhile promoting positive identity-build-
ing and legitimization within West Germany. It also enjoyed wide popular reso-
nance, not only within the Federal Republic but also abroad, at least outside
the Soviet bloc. On this basis, one would have expected the refugee who ran
across the border on December 19, 1975, to have been welcomed with open
arms in the Federal Republic and the two people who had apparently died on
the eastern side to have received extensive attention as victims of communist
oppression.
That was not to be the case, however. Far from being greeted as a hero,Werner
Weinhold was arrested by West German police in Marl on December 22, 1975.
This was because his flight to the West had been anything but an innocent,
7West German governmental declaration of July 28, 1976, in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes
der Bundesregierung, 1976, 847.
8“Jenseits der Mauer,” Bonner Rundschau, August 14, 1975.
9“Berlin, 13. August 1961,” Rheinische Post, August 10, 1962. See also Hans-Hermann Hertle and
Gerhard Sälter, “Die Todesopfer an Mauer und Grenze,” Deutschland-Archiv 39 (2006): 667–76.
10“‘Ich sah genau, wie der Grepo seinen Kameraden niederschoss,’” Bild, January 7, 1974.
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unsullied leap for freedom. The 26-year-old Weinhold had accumulated a long
criminal record in the GDR. He had spent several years in prison since the late
1960s, primarily because of repeated car thefts but partly also because of a
foiled attempt to escape to the west in autumn 1968.11 After his release, he had
been drafted for military service in a tank regiment near Cottbus, close to the
Polish border. In the early morning hours of December 15, 1975, Weinhold
deserted his unit, taking with him a submachine gun and more than 300
rounds of ammunition. During the next fourteen hours, he made his way west-
ward across East Germany, stealing three cars along the way, at one point bran-
dishing his weapon at two unarmed traffic-police officers, and eventually
entering the extended border zone vis-à-vis the Federal Republic near
Hildburghausen in southern Thuringia. By this time, a large-scale search for
him had been launched, and once the last of Weinhold’s three stolen cars was dis-
covered in the Thuringian border district, the manhunt became increasingly loca-
lized and intensive. To avoid detection, Weinhold spent the next three days
hiding in a haystack inside a barn, in freezing temperatures, surreptitiously stealing
food conserves from the neighboring farmhouse, biding his time. Shortly after
midnight on December 19 he finally left his hideout, fully armed; walked and
crawled his way through forested terrain to the nearby east-west border in the
moonlit night; and managed to reach the Federal Republic some two hours
later.12 Weinhold’s escape had succeeded, but the criminal activity that had
accompanied his exit had apparently reached a disturbing crescendo at the last
east-west hurdle. According to very credible-sounding reports that soon began
to emerge from the GDR, he had shot and killed two young East German
military conscripts who had been performing guard duty at the border:
twenty-one-year-old Klaus Peter Seidel and twenty-year-old Jürgen Lange.13
In other words, the usual roles of inter-German border tragedies had been
reversed: an armed escapee had apparently slain two frontline guards to secure
his exit from the GDR to the Federal Republic.
Although Weinhold’s case was highly unusual, it was not unique. Other
people, too, shot and killed on-duty East German border guards. According to
the official GDR count, twenty-five guards lost their lives while in service on
the German-German border over the years. Most were killed in connection
11See the several sentences by East German courts, available in Bundesarchiv, Berlin Lichterfelde
(hereafter BAL): DP 3, 441.
12Staatsanwaltschaft Essen, interrogation protocols of Werner Weinhold, December 22, 1975, and
January 13, 1976, both in ZBDoSt: AR-ZE 30/76; DDRGrenztruppen, “Abschlussbericht über den
gewaltsamen Grenzdurchbruch mit Anwendung der Schusswaffe am 19.12.1975, gegen 2.40 Uhr, im
Abschnitt ca. 2000 m. südlich der Ortschaft Harras, III Grenzbataillon, Grenzregiment 9
Hildburghausen,” December 23, 1975, Bundesarchiv-Militärachiv, Freiburg (hereafter BA-MA):
GT 6493.
13“Grenzsoldaten der DDR meuchlings ermordet,” Neues Deutschland (hereafter ND), December
22, 1975.
CONTESTED LEGITIMACY AT THE GERMAN-GERMAN BORDER 83
with escape attempts, often in murky circumstances. The first death occurred in
August 1949—shortly before the GDR had even been founded—and the last in
March 1985, with Seidel and Lange the twentieth and twenty-first victims on the
official list.14 Each case received extensive publicity in East Germany, as the dead
guards assumed central importance within the wider East German counter-
narrative about the German-German border. Although this discourse had
begun to emerge in the 1950s, apace with the advancing fortification of the
GDR’s western frontier, it shot to full prominence after the building of the
Berlin Wall in August 1961. Its central point, repeated again and again in govern-
mental statements, official publications, and the news media, was that the building
of a highly fortified boundary vis-à-vis the Federal Republic had been a defensive
measure of last resort, imposed on East Berlin by persistent aggression and hostility
from the west. Espionage, subversion, sabotage, moral corruption, and violent
attacks against property and people all featured prominently on the list of
alleged western transgressions, but the most pernicious activity bore the label of
“Menschenhandel” or “Kopfjägerei”(i.e., “trafficking in human beings” and “head-
hunting”). According to Neues Deutschland, “spy headquarters in West Germany
and West Berlin” had been conducting “systematic recruitment of citizens of the
German Democratic Republic and organizing downright ‘trafficking in human
beings’” (Menschenhandel).15 In other words, the massive westward migration of
East Germans between the late 1940s and early 1960s had been primarily the
result of sinister machinations by western agents and agitators, who had been target-
ing GDR citizens, luring them away under false pretenses, sometimes even kidnap-
ping them. All this had ultimately forced long-suffering East Berlin to close its entire
border vis-à-vis thewest, particularly because the latter had harbored evenmore sin-
ister plans of aggression. As Walter Ulbricht himself explained in a televised speech
in late August 1961, the west’s espionage and sabotage activities, including the per-
sistent Menschenhandel, had aimed to “create the conditions in which . . . it would
have been possible to launch an open attack against the GDR.”16
To underscore the seriousness and the perseverance of thewestern threat, the East
German narrative, too, drew on the precedent of the Third Reich and posited a
close continuity between the Nazi era and the Federal Republic. A well-known
1960s propaganda film about divided Berlin, for example, traced a “direct road
from Hitler’s Third Reich to the Adenauer era” for most “Nazi criminals.”17 But
14Kurt Frotscher and Horst Liebig, Opfer deutscher Teilung. Beim Grenzschutz getötet (Schkeuditz:
GNN-Verlag, 2005).
15“Beschluss des Ministerrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” and “DDR-Patrioten
enthüllen Methoden der Menschenhändler,” both in ND, August 13, 1961.
16“Ansprache des Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Walter
Ulbricht, im Rundfunk und Fernsehen,” ND, August 19, 1961.
171962 DEFA-documentary “Schaut auf diese Stadt,” Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv, Berlin (hereafter
BA-FA): Dokumentarfilme ab 1945, G-Z.
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the key point here was neither continuity on the level of individuals nor a specific
link between Nazism and the Federal Republic. It was rather the generic circum-
stance of capitalism as the structural basis for expansionist aggression and, at least
potentially, fascism. This structurally rooted fascist potential ultimately explained
the threat faced by East Germany, justified the defensive border fortifications, and
exposed the illegitimacy of the Federal Republic as an unreformed morass of reac-
tion, in contrast to the fundamentally transformed, peace-loving, and progressive
GDR, whose antifascist credentials made it the better, peaceful, progressive, and
therefore more legitimate German state.
This grand narrative changed relatively little between the early 1960s and the
mid-1970s. Although some of the sharpest Nazi analogies faded from East
German rhetoric, too, the GDR’s overall account of the rationale for its west-
ward-facing border regime remained uncompromising. According to the official
line, East Berlin’s decisive actions had dealt a severe blow to western “re-
vanchists,” particularly on August 13, 1961, when they had rescued “peace in
Europe in a critical situation,” paving the way for east-west détente on the con-
tinent.18 But the imperialist threat had not been eliminated. The western “Saul
had not been transformed into Paul,” to quote one biblically well-versed com-
mentator.19 Multiple dangers persisted, and vigilance at the boundary remained
essential.
Within this broad narrative, the East German border guards killed in the line of
duty starred in two separate, yet closely linked roles. On the one hand, they were
victims of the fascist and proto-fascist western forces that had allegedly caused
their deaths. As victims, they personified the dangers that the border system sup-
posedly served to tame and therefore provided a key justification for its existence.
But they were also heroes, everyday socialist personalities who had risen to an
extreme challenge in an extraordinary way, sacrificing themselves for the
common good and providing an example for everyone else. Through the con-
centrated publicity campaigns that followed their deaths, the fallen guards were
transformed into secular deities of a particular type in a much wider pantheon
of socialist heroes that the East German elites had systematically created for pur-
poses of popular mobilization, legitimization, and identity-building, drawing on
models initially introduced in the Soviet Union. Alongside other, previously
established hero types, including those of the antifascist resisters and the pioneers
of postwar reconstruction, they represented yet another category, best labeled
hero-victims of the socialist frontier.20 They became mobilization and
18“Zum 13. August,” ND, August 13, 1976; “13. August 1961—ein Tat für Frieden und
Sicherheit,” ND, August 14/15, 1976.
19“Zehn Jahre danach,” Berliner Zeitung, August 13, 1971.
20On socialist heroes in the GDR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, see Silke Satjukow and Rainer
Grieds, eds., Sozialistische Helden. Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in Osteuropa und der
DDR (Berlin: Links, 2002).
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identification figures who could potentially be used to forge links between the
regime and the people and to inspire the population to enhanced efforts on
behalf of the socialist collective. Accordingly, personality cults of a sort were con-
structed around the dead guards: the immediate media barrage surrounding each
death was followed by further waves of politically instrumentalized attention and
commemoration, including highly publicized funeral rites, frequent media com-
mentary, prominent memorials, commemorative ceremonies of various sorts,
particularly on important anniversary dates, as well as extensive campaigns to
name various institutions around the country after individual martyred border
guards.21
These efforts, which had started in the 1950s and intensified in the early 1960s,
following the building of the Berlin Wall, were well established by the mid-
1970s. They were in plentiful evidence, once again, after the killings of
December 19, 1975, as Klaus Peter Seidel and Jürgen Lange were lavished
with the kind of posthumous attention that various other slain border guards
had received in preceding years. The early media coverage portrayed the two
men as hero-victims “treacherously murdered” by the ruthless criminal
Weinhold while “responsibly carrying out their duty to protect the state
border of the German Democratic Republic.”22 Both got a posthumous pro-
motion and a military decoration for the “exemplary and selfless fulfillment of
their obligations.”23 Their respective funerals were stately, large-scale affairs,
attended by “leading generals and officers” and relayed to every corner of the
republic through the mass media.24 Lange and Seidel were also promptly given
dedicated memory sites that served as venues for regular commemorative
rituals. Their military unit in the town of Eishausen established a collective me-
morial for the two men, and each also received an individualized memory site in
his hometown, East Berlin in the case of Seidel and Werdau in that of Lange. All
three sites witnessed elaborate ceremonies in honor of the fallen hero-victims on
key anniversaries, including those of their deaths, which aimed not only to com-
memorate the fallen guards but also to mobilize the population in general and
some special target groups, including currently serving border guards and the
country’s youth, in particular to greater individual and collective exertions.25
With the same goal in mind, the authorities also kept naming various institutions,
such as children’s homes and youth organizations, after the fallen guards, as a part
21On these processes, see Pertti Ahonen,Death at the Berlin Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), esp. chap. 3 and 4.
22“Grenzsoldaten der DDR meuchlings ermordet,” ND, December 22, 1975.
23“Ermordete Grenzsoldaten wurden posthum geehrt,” ND, December 23, 1976.
24“Ermordete Grenzsoldaten mit militärischen Ehren beigesetzt,” Volksarmee, no. 1 (1976).
25See, for example, “Ehrendes Gedenken für ermordete Grenzsoldaten,” Berliner Zeitung,
December 20, 1976; “Ehrendes Gedenken für ermordete Grenzsoldaten,” ND, December 20, 1982.
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of their campaign to stamp the names and fates of Klaus Peter Seidel and Jürgen
Lange onto East German public memory.26
But theWeinhold incident also gave the GDR openings for more far-reaching
public relations activity. Unlike most other shootings of East German border
guards, this particular case had yielded a culprit who was not only alive and phys-
ically unharmed but also identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and, even more
tantalizingly, under arrest in the rival German polity. All this meant that in
many ways the pressure would be on the Federal Republic to prove that it
would abide by standard legal norms in its treatment of a man under suspicion
for what could be defined as manslaughter or possibly even murder—a reversal
of the typical legal scenario in the aftermath of deadly incidents at the
German-German border. The prosecution and possible punishment of Werner
Weinhold therefore became a highly politicized and sensitive matter in the
broader struggle between the two Germanies, as it gave the GDR a chance to
turn the tables on its great rival, to go on the offensive where it had normally
been forced on the defensive.
Predictably, the GDRwasted no time in announcing its demands to the world.
It maintained that Weinhold, a callous career criminal, had cold-bloodedly mur-
dered two innocent soldiers and that he should therefore be taken into custody
and extradited to the GDR for prosecution. Weinhold’s prompt arrest in
December 1975 ensued on the basis of the East German charges, but extradition
was out of the question, despite all of East Berlin’s pleas and threats, because it
would have implied recognition of the GDR as a second fully sovereign
German state—anathema to Bonn even in the age of détente—and because
the Federal Republic did not normally extradite German citizens in any case.27
As a result, Weinhold spent the first months of 1976 in a West German prison,
while the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) in Essen investigated the
case and prepared charges against him.
In the meantime, two sharply conflicting narratives of the events of December
19, 1975, and their background received wide circulation. Weinhold’s own
version, promulgated primarily through numerous interviews, stressed his long-
standing rejection of the East German system. Starting with conflicts with his
“staunchly communist” father, he claimed to have grown into an oppositional
figure who “liked to listen to the Rolling Stones rather than to the teachings of
Lenin” and whose disillusionment with the regime became complete during
his time in prison, particularly in the notorious penitentiary of Bautzen, where
he was incarcerated after his failed escape attempt of 1968. Personal factors had
26See, for example, “Köpenicker Kinderheim erhielt Ehrennamen,” ND, December 7, 1983.
27See, for example, the GDR’s Generalstaatsanwalt to the Federal Republic’s Minister of Justice,
December 21, 1975, and January 23, 1976; and Generalstaatsanwalt Hamm to the GDR’s
Generalstaatsanwalt, February 27, 1976, all in BAL: DP 3, 441.
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also contributed to his victimization. Shortly before his flight to the west in
December 1975 he had discovered that his wife of two years, with whom he
had an infant daughter, had started seeing another man. With nothing left to
hold him back in the GDR, Weinhold had “just wanted to get away” and
reach “freedom.”28
Weinhold maintained that he never meant to kill anyone and that his behavior
in the border strip on the night of December 19 was entirely reactive and defen-
sive. According to his account, he was only some 100 meters away from the final
border fence vis-à-vis the west, in a state of high exhaustion and nervous tension,
when a guard suddenly stood up, some thirty to fifty meters to his right, and
ordered him to stop. Immediately thereafter, another guard, who was lying on
the ground in the same area, opened fire at him without warning. In reaction,
Weinhold took cover and shot back, in self-defense, first at the guard who had
initially opened fire and then at his colleague. Once his tormenters had stopped
shooting, Weinhold got up and stormed his way across the final border fortifica-
tions to West Germany. In other words, Weinhold admitted having shot at two
border guards, but only in self-defense, in fear for his life, with no intent to kill
and no knowledge of what damage his actions might have caused.29
In sharp contrast, the GDR’s version of the events predictably said nothing
about alleged political motives behind Weinhold’s actions. From East Berlin’s
perspective, Weinhold was a career criminal “with several previous convictions”
who had fled the country to escape the consequences of his own transgressions.
According to East German prosecutors, he had committed an unspecified “sexual
offense” shortly before his violent exit, and his main motive had been to evade
investigation and punishment for that act.30 On his way from the GDR to the
Federal Republic, several further felonies had ensued, among them desertion,
repeated larceny, and—most significantly—double murder. The murder accusa-
tions reflected an interpretation of the deaths of border guards Lange and Seidel,
purportedly constructed from autopsy records and crime-scene investigations,
which starkly contradicted Weinhold’s own account of events in the border
strip. According to East German authorities, neither Seidel nor Lange had fired
a single bullet. The former had met his death in a seated position, while the
latter had lain prone on the ground, crawling away from the gunman. Both
had been shot from close range, from a few meters’ distance at most, in an
28“‘Jetzt must du schiessen,’ dachte ich, ‘sonst erschiessen sie dich,’” Bild, June 5, 1976; “DerMann,
der Ost-Berlin 100,000 Mark wert ist,” Welt am Sonntag, June 13, 1976.
29Along with the sources in the previous note, see also “Die würden mich zweimal zum Tode ver-
urteilen,” Bild, June 10, 1976; “Zwei Tote auf dem Weg nach Westen,” Stern, June 16, 1976;
“Schiessen war mein einziger Ausweg,” Quick, June 23, 1976.
30See, for example, “Weinhold ist an die DDR auszuliefern,” Unsere Zeit, June 18, 1976;
“Grenzsoldaten der DDR meuchlings ermordet,” ND, December 22, 1975.
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almost execution-like fashion. The escapee had been no innocent victim but a
cold-blooded aggressor.31
The legal drama around Weinhold moved into higher gear in late November
1976 when his trial on two charges of manslaughter finally began in Essen, fol-
lowing prolonged legal wrangling. The East German authorities had never
ceased demanding the accused man’s extradition, and in a highly controversial
move they had even offered a reward of 100,000 Deutschmarks for his capture
and delivery to the GDR at a point in mid-1976 when Weinhold was briefly
released from detention.32 But in the months leading to the trial they had also
provided the West German prosecutors with selected pieces of evidence, albeit
in a fashion that arguably undermined rather than boosted the Essen prosecutors’
case: the copied documents handed over by the GDR were not even officially
verified, which was bound to fuel questions about their veracity—and about
that of the East German version of the events in general. To make matters
worse, the GDR also refused to provide any additional materials or to allow wit-
nesses to travel to Essen to testify.33
Given these problems, it was not entirely surprising that the Essen court found
Weinhold not guilty in early December 1976. Hard evidence for what had hap-
pened on the night of December 19, 1975, remained scanty, and much of what
was available seemed potentially unreliable, in good part because of the GDR’s
refusal to be more cooperative. Therefore, in the presence of reasonable doubt,
the court was in many ways obliged to decide in the defendant’s favor. Other
aspects of the trial provoked consternation, however. Various commentators
raised procedural criticisms: only one-and-a-half days of deliberations, few wit-
nesses, judges who seemed far too willing to accept Weinhold’s statements at
face value.34 But the fiercest controversy surrounded the rather adventurous
and highly politicized justifications that the judges provided for their verdict.
According to the lengthy written ruling, the GDR was a fundamentally unjust
polity that arbitrarily limited its people’s freedom of movement, most glaringly
by “violently preventing [its] citizens from leaving its territory.” To maintain
control, the regime had turned the country into a “heavily armed fortress,”
guarded not only by “trenches, mine fields, and automatic shooting devices”
but above all by heavily armed border personnel. Because of the criminal
31“Abschlussbericht über den gewaltsamen Grenzdurchbruch mit Anwendung der Schusswaffe am
19.12.1975, gegen 2.40 Uhr, im Abschnitt ca. 2000 m. südlich der Ortschaft Harras, III
Grenzbataillon, Grenzregiment 9 Hildburghausen,” December 23, 1975, BA-MA: GT 6493;
Institut für gerichtliche Medizin, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, “Gerichtmedizinisches
Gutachten vom 13.2.1978,” BAL: DP 3, 436.
32“Steckbrief gegen Doppelmörder Weinhold,” Berliner Zeitung, June 9, 1976.
33The GDR’s Generalstaatsanwalt to the Federal Republic’s Minister of Justice, November 19,
1976, BAL: DP 3, 441.
34“Wenige Fragen, Verzicht auf Zeugen,” Frankfurter Rundschau (hereafter FR), December 1, 1976;
“Ein Stück deutscher Tragik?,” Die Zeit, December 3, 1976.
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Schiessbefehl, the guards were under orders to “fire at escapees in a targeted way,
without warning, to kill,” and in practice they “use[d] their weapons with unpar-
alleled unscrupulousness.” Under such “inhumane conditions,” which consti-
tuted “a violation of the fundamental principles of justice (Rechtsstaatlichkeit),”
individuals had the right to pursue their “freedom of movement” and to
defend themselves against armed attack from representatives of the GDR
regime, even with violence, as Weinhold had done. The theft of several vehicles
during the escape and even the use of his firearm had been necessary “self-
defense.” In the border strip in particular, “no lesser means” than shooting had
been available for the escapee to defend himself against the potentially lethal
attack against him launched by the border guards. In the end, Weinhold’s
“basic right to freedom of movement and the resulting prospect of living in a
free country” justified his actions and necessitated an acquittal.35
To be sure, the judges were aware of their ruling’s potentially radical impli-
cations, and they laced their conclusions with certain qualifiers. They argued
that the justification of self-defense for violent action against the GDR’s inhu-
mane border system applied only when the escapee in question did not
provoke the emergency in the first place by deliberately intending to kill or other-
wise harm East German officials. In vague terms at least, they suggested that any
violence committed by an escapee had to be reactive, a response to potentially
life-threatening action initiated by armed East German officials, rather than a
proactive assault.36
Although these qualifiers did somewhat lessen the political edge of the Essen
court’s verdict, a storm of controversy immediately broke out. In the Federal
Republic, the public echo was divided, roughly along the lines that had separated
the center-right opponents and center-left proponents of the Social-Liberal gov-
ernment’s newOstpolitik since the start of the decade. To be sure, most politicians
abstained from explicit public statements about the trial, stressing the indepen-
dence of the judiciary in the West German political system. But numerous
media outlets seized the chance to expound on the ruling. Predictably, conserva-
tive commentators found much to commend in Weinhold’s acquittal and the
court’s general denunciation of the East German regime, while much of the
left-liberal wing of the media establishment waxed notably critical.37 Journalists
feared that the ruling could be read as an endorsement of a sort of everyman’s
right to shoot his way out of the GDR, which might turn “the border
between the two German states” into a “civil war boundary.”38 Critics also
35Landgericht Essen, sentence of Werner Weinhold, December 2, 1976, BAL: DP 3/447, esp. 38,
40, 42, 46, 48–9.
36Ibid., esp. 43–96.
37See, for example, “Campagne der DDR,” Rheinischer Merkur, December 10, 1976; “Frei!,” BZ,
December 3, 1976.
38“Unwahrscheinliche Freude,” Der Spiegel, December 6, 1976.
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argued that, despite all its faults, “the GDR was no super-sized Auschwitz in
which any form of reactive violence counted as self-defense.”39
Even these relatively harsh criticisms paled in comparison with East German
reactions, which were, unsurprisingly, vitriolic. In a reversal of many earlier
German-German discourses about deaths at the borderline, the GDR attacked
the Federal Republic head-on for allegedly violating all manner of legal and
humanitarian norms. According to East German commentators, the case had,
yet again, exposed West Germany as an oppressive capitalist society in which
fair trials were impossible, not least because of the numerous “Nazi judges” still
in service there.40 It had also proved that the Federal Republic grossly breached
“all principles of international law” by refusing to extradite a dangerous criminal
to the “sovereign state” in which he had committed his evil deeds.41 All this alleg-
edly violated the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies and the multi-
lateral Helsinki Accords signed in summer 1975, proving that “anti-détente
forces” in the Federal Republic wanted to “restart the Cold War.”42 The Essen
court gave a perverse reading of an individual’s presumed right to self-defense,
distorting it into a general license to kill and “making itself guilty of instigation
to murder.” The judges’ underlying agenda was to “encourage . . . attacks
against the GDR’s state border” and to endorse the shooting of on-duty GDR
officials with impunity.43 In ensuing weeks, the East German media reported
extensively on allegedly widespread popular “fury” about the “shameful
verdict,” expressed primarily through protest resolutions adopted by numerous
workplace collectives from throughout the land, more than 1,500 of which
had reached the West German permanent representation in East Berlin by
January 1977.44 The resolutions, as well as other statements by journalists and po-
litical leaders, kept demanding Weinhold’s extradition to the GDR, so that he
could be tried properly.
The extradition demands still lacked any chance of success in the Federal
Republic, but the Essen court’s controversial decision was not the final judicial
word on the Weinhold case. The prosecutors immediately appealed to the
West German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), which in September 1977
decided in their favor. Criticizing the court of first instance for failing to
39“Ein deutsches Urteil,” FR, December 3, 1976.
40“Anstiftung zum Mord,” Berliner Zeitung, December 3, 1976.
41“Doppelmörder an DDR-Grenzsoldaten wurde in der BRD freigesprochen,”ND, December 3,
1976; “Urteil zielt gegen die Entspannung,” Tribüne, December 13, 1976.
42“Der Doppelmörder Weinhold gehört vor ein Gericht der DDR,” ND, January 19, 1977.
43“Anstiftung zum Mord,” Berliner Zeitung, December 3, 1976; Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler,
“Verbrecher als Held,” Bauern-Echo, December 4, 1976.
44See, for example, “Schandurteil angeprangert,” Tribüne, December 14, 1976; “Proteste gegen
Essener Schandurteil halten an,” ND, December 28, 1976; Gaus to the Auswärtiges Amt, January
27, 1977, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1977 (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 2008), 90-91.
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investigate the case properly, the judges overturned the Essen ruling and ordered a
new trial in the near-by town of Hagen.45
This trial, which stretched from October to December 1978, unfolded in a
spirit very different from that which had prevailed in Essen two years earlier.
The court made a much more conscientious attempt to examine the events of
December 19, 1975, and their background. It spent thirteen days deliberating
the case, hearing thirty-five witnesses, and it subjected the witnesses and, more
importantly, the defendant to the kind of serious cross-examination that had
been missing from the first trial.46 The proceedings even included a visit to the
inter-German border near the site of the double killing, a tense affair on a
foggy autumn day, during which Weinhold insisted on wearing a bulletproof
vest for fear of East German sharpshooters.47 The court’s efforts were also bol-
stered by enhanced cooperation from GDR authorities. While still refusing to
allow key witnesses to travel to testify at Hagen, the East Germans conducted
public judicial hearings to assemble relevant evidence, which they then sent to
the court, this time properly certified.48 As an additional source of moral pressure,
they even allowed the elderly parents of the two victims to attend the proceedings
as joint plaintiffs.49
The Hagen court’s final ruling also differed sharply from that of its Essen
counterpart. This time, the judges largely followed the East German account
of the events. To be sure, they rejected some of the GDR’s characterization of
Weinhold, such as the claims that he had committed a serious sexual offense
shortly before his escape. But they also dismissed Weinhold’s attempts to
portray himself as a committed anticommunist. In their view, the defendant
was no “spiritual or political person” but rather a man driven by his own “ego-
centric notions,” without noticeable “ideals or ideologies” who had embarked
on his escape attempt impulsively, as an “act of defiance” against perceived per-
sonal and societal slights. In his rush toward the inter-German border, heavily
armed, he had engaged in “a calamitous play with fire.” He had committed
several offenses, ranging from desertion to multiple counts of theft, for which
he would have been subject to arrest in the Federal Republic, too. In the
45“Freispruch für Weinhold aufgehoben,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (hereafter SZ), September 11, 1977.
46“Die letzten Zeugen halfen nicht mehr,” Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, December 2/3, 1978.
47“Trotz kugelsicherer Weste—Weinhold zitterte vor Angst,”Westfälische Rundschau, November 4,
1978.
48“Protokoll über die gerichtliche Beweiserhebung des 2. Strafsenats des Bezirksgerichts Dresden
vom 26. April 1978 bis zum 28. April 1978 auf Grund des Rechtshilfeersuches des
Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR vom 10. Februar 1978 in der Auslieferungsangelegenheit Werner
Weinhold,” BAL: DP 2, 2223; “Protokoll über die ergänzende gerichtliche Beweiserhebung des
2. Strafsenats des Bezirksgerichts Dresden vom 4. August 1978 auf Grund des Rechtshilfeersuches
des Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR vom 10. Februar 1978 in der Auslieferungsangelegenheit Werner
Weinhold,” BAL: DP 2, 2224.
49“Auf dem Richtertisch lag die Kalaschnikow,” Hagener Zeitung, October 24, 1978.
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border strip, he had willfully provoked a dangerous situation, and then, acting “in
effect” but not in legitimate self-defense, shot and killed Lange and Seidel, firing
first and from close range, in reaction to a warning shout from Seidel, without
either guard taking a shot at him. The judges acknowledged several mitigating
circumstances, includingWeinhold’s complicated personal history, the extraordi-
nary situation in which the shooting had taken place, as well as the broader
political context of “the unlawful measures at the border” that the GDR had
implemented with its “border wall, barbed wire, death strip, and
Schiessbefehl.” But they stressed that “human life” nevertheless remained “the
highest legally protected interest” and that an individual’s claim to “the funda-
mental right of freedom of movement” had to remain subordinate to it, even
at the inter-German boundary. The court pronounced Weinhold guilty of man-
slaughter and larceny and sentenced him to five-and-a-half years in prison, a judg-
ment that was subsequently confirmed on appeal.50
This outcome was greeted as “fair” and “measured” by most West German
commentators, with particular praise for the “intensive fashion” in which the
court had “grappled with the situation of a transgressing individual in a repressive
state.” There was also predictable criticism from some conservatives, however,
who denounced the verdict as a disturbing example of east-west “normalization”
gone awry.51 Equally predictably, the GDRminced nowords in condemning the
trial as a ludicrously lenient “rescue operation” for a “double murderer” and cen-
suring the Federal Republic, yet again, for its persistent “violations of inter-
national law” in not extraditing Weinhold to the GDR.52 As Weinhold
disappeared into prison, however, the case faded from the headlines, and by his
release in summer 1982, the entire episode no longer commanded much
public interest, except through continued ritualistic commemorations of the
hero-victims Lange and Seidel in the GDR.53
Having served his time, Weinhold continued to live in the Ruhr area of West
Germany under another name, unaware of the fact that the Stasi stayed tightly on
his heels. In a long-term operation code named “Terrorist,” agents kept
Weinhold under surveillance and prepared various plans to kidnap or kill him.
The conspiratorial scenarios sketched out in the Stasi blueprints ranged from an
artificially arranged car crash to an “accident” involving power cables and an
elaborate plot to drug Weinhold and then smuggle him into the GDR in a
50Landgericht Hagen, sentence of Werner Weinhold, December 1, 1978, esp. 11, 52, 56, 58, 63,
67-70; Bundesgerichtshof, “Urteil in der Strafsache gegenWernerWeinhold,” August 23, 1979, both
in ZBDoSt: AR-ZE 30/76.
51“Abgewogenes Urteil,” FR, December 2, 1978; “Penible Sorgfalt nach einem Vorurteil,” SZ,
December 2/3, 1978; “Flucht und Fahnenflucht,” Die Welt, December 2/3, 1978; “Verurteilter
Weinhold bekommt CSU-Hilfe,” Die Tat, December, 1978.
52“Doppelmörder und Terrorist in der BRD weiter auf freiem Fuss,” ND, December 6, 1978.
53“Werner Weinhold in drei Wochen frei!,” Neue Ruhr-Zeitung, June 15, 1982; “Ehrendes
Gedenken an ermordete Grenzsoldaten,” ND, December 20, 1982.
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purpose-built vehicle. In the end, none of these plans was implemented because
they were deemed too politically risky, but they remained on the books and led to
investigations and arrests after German unification.54 More bizarrely, Weinhold
also briefly reappeared in media headlines in the new millennium. In early
2005, he shot and seriously wounded a middle-aged man in a bar in the town
of Marl for no obvious reason—a transgression for which he was sentenced to
prison yet again, this time for thirty months.55
With its bizarre twists and turns that continued long after the end of the Cold
War, WernerWeinhold’s complicated and rather melancholy tale illustrates some
of the cruel human consequences of Germany’s national division. But it also does
much more. Particularly in the broader setting of the mid-1970s, it provides an
illuminating case study of the manifold challenges that the era of détente posed
for the two Germanies and the interaction between them, on both the judicial
and political levels, with the pressures of continued conflict and budding
cooperation pulling the two states in conflicting directions.
In judicial terms, the Weinhold case showed just how difficult legal
cooperation across the inter-German divide remained, even in a period of
improving east-west ties. To be sure, potential bases for such cooperation were
not entirely lacking in the mid-1970s. Most notably, a rather obscure West
German law of 1953 made it theoretically possible for the Federal Republic’s
judicial authorities to hand criminal suspects over to their East German counter-
parts, not as a formal extradition (Auslieferung) but as a more narrowly defined
inner-German “handing-over” (Zulieferung).56 Any such actions were subject
to strict preconditions, which had grown increasingly restrictive over the years,
however: among other things, there had to be guarantees of a fair trial with an
unbiased judge, no political objectives, and no other unfair disadvantages to
the defendant. Any potential application of the death penalty—still in use
in the GDR, unlike in the Federal Republic—constituted a particular red flag
for the West German authorities. As a result, no criminal suspect had been
handed over to the East Germans since the 1950s, and the bar for any future
attempts to do so was set very high by a precedent-setting legal case of 1974 in
which the West German Federal Constitutional Court rejected the handing
over of a seventeen-year-old girl who had killed her sadistically abusive father
in the GDR and then fled to the west.57 Concrete legal cooperation between
the two Germanies therefore remained minimal, and the negotiations about a
54“Weitere Festnahmen im Zusammenhang mit einem Stasi-Mordauftrag,” Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (hereafter FAZ), May 22, 1993; “So ein Ding,” Der Spiegel, May 24, 1993.
55“Weinhold muss für 30 Monate hinter Gitter,” Marler Zeitung, June 25, 2005.
56This was the West German “Gesetz über die innerdeutsche Rechts- und Amtshilfe.”
57“Auslieferung ist nur noch Ausnahme,” Der Spiegel, April 8, 1974; “‘Republikflüchtling’Werner
Weinhold vor Gericht,” FR, November 26, 1976; “Muss Werner Weinhold mit der Todesstrafe
rechnen?,” Neue Ruhrzeitung, June 26, 1976.
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bilateral judicial assistance agreement launched in 1973 had been progressing very
slowly.58
With its high public prominence, the Weinhold case exposed the limits of
inter-German judicial cooperation in a particularly glaring way. It had a direct
impact on the ongoing talks between Bonn and East Berlin about the provision
of bilateral judicial assistance. The East German side made repeated attempts to
link the two issues, threatening to disrupt the negotiations if its demands
vis-à-vis Weinhold were not met. Although the talks never got completely
derailed, they repeatedly stalled because of the East German protests, which grew
particularly vociferous in the aftermath of Weinhold’s acquittal in the Essen trial
in December 1976.59 East-west disputes about the legal evaluation of
Weinhold’s actions thereby waxed into a significant obstacle to judicial cooperation
between the two Germanies, even at the level of general inter-state agreements.
The concrete dynamics of Weinhold’s prosecution provided an even clearer
illustration of the conflicting pressures that the rise of détente imposed on judicial
interaction between the two Germanies. From the West German legal perspec-
tive, the situation looked relatively straightforward. To be sure, theWeinhold case
was surrounded by public controversies and certain politicized pressures, but the
Federal Republic’s judiciary did possess extensive independence, and public pros-
ecutors in particular were keen to pursue the matter. Weinhold’s extradition to
the GDR was out of the question, as was any kind of Zulieferung, not least
because of the possibility that he might face the death penalty in East
Germany. Prosecution in West German courts therefore became a priority
once the rough outlines of the events of December 19, 1975, were known.
Proper investigation of the matter remained difficult, however. The only living
eyewitness to what had happened was apparently Weinhold himself. The crime
scene lay in the GDR, as did nearly all immediately relevant evidentiary material.
Given these facts, theWest German judiciary was very heavily dependent on East
German authorities and their willingness to assist its investigations.
In the GDR, official attitudes toward the Weinhold case were a good deal
more ambivalent, even contradictory. The ideal East German scenario would
have been to try Weinhold in the GDR, preferably following his extradition—
or at least Zulieferung—from the Federal Republic. When this outcome
proved unreachable and a trial in West Germany became the only viable way
to punish Weinhold, however, East Berlin’s authorities found themselves
drawn between two objectives. On the one hand, they wanted to see
Weinhold convicted and suitably sentenced, simply to prevent the incident
from being perceived as “an invitation to use violence at the border” by other
58“‘DDR’ droht. Diese Freilassung bleibt nicht ohne Folgen,” Die Welt, June 9, 1976.
59“Bonn weist erneuten DDR-Protest gegen Freispruch Weinholds zurück,” Bonner General-
Anzeiger, April 27, 1977.
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potential escapees.60 On the other hand, they were keenly aware of the continu-
ing public relations advantages that the case could provide, particularly if embar-
rassing judicial developments in the Federal Republic were to cast a pall on their
great rival. As a result, the GDR authorities adopted seemingly contradictory
stances, particularly early in the West German judicial proceedings, cooperating
to a limited degree, for example by handing over some relevant documents,
but stopping well short of the kind of full assistance that might have guaranteed
Weinhold’s conviction. This vacillation between what a journalist labeled
“opportunistic political considerations” and the provision of “optimal evidence
for a criminal trial” characterized East German actions throughout the
Weinhold proceedings, even if the balance gradually shifted somewhat toward
the latter pole.61 Such highly strained cooperation highlighted the challenges
that the era of détente posed for the relationship between the two German
states, not only in the courtrooms, but—more significantly—also on the wider
political stage. The judicial proceedings against Weinhold were highly politicized
events, and their political impact showed most clearly in their contributions to the
ongoing inter-German battle over legitimacy that raged on largely undiminished
even in the changing context of the mid-1970s.
This legitimacy duel had never been a contest of equals. The Federal Republic
had been much more successful in acquiring early international recognition from
the start; by the 1950s the vast majority of countries outside the Soviet sphere had
already established normal relations with Bonn. The GDR, by contrast, had long
remained a political pariah, unrecognized anywhere beyond the communist bloc,
in good part because of the Hallstein Doctrine, a West German policy principle
that stipulated that a recognition of the GDR by a given state was an “unfriendly
act” that would provoke a strong reaction from the Federal Republic, probably a
rupture of bilateral relations.62 East Germany had also lagged behind its western
rival in more tangible, everyday kinds of legitimacy. By the 1950s, the Federal
Republic’s social-market economy had generated the so-called economic
miracle, which lacked equivalents in the GDR. The expanding individual oppor-
tunities and growing affluence in which West Germans seemed to be basking
contrasted starkly with the collective restrictions and various shortages that
plagued the East German economy. To make matters worse, many of the attri-
butes associated with the Federal Republic enjoyed much higher popular
appeal on both sides of the inter-German divide than did their East German
counterparts: not only the economic dynamism but also the rhetorical espousal
60Neues Deutschland editor-in-chief Joachim Herrmann, as reported in Gaus to the Auswärtiges
Amt, June 10, 1976, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1976 (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 2007), 852.
61“Der Freispruch von Essen,” SZ, December 3, 1976.
62See William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany,
1949–1969 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
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of individual liberty as well as the links to the west and its traditions rather than to
the more controversial Soviet model of eastern Europe. The unpopularity of the
East German system had been starkly evident in the massive outflow of its popu-
lation to the Federal Republic, which by 1961 had not only deprived the GDRof
up to 3.5 million mostly young citizens but also handed a powerful public
relations trump to the West Germans, who could present the exodus as evidence
of the East German people “voting with their feet” against their illegitimate
regime.63 The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had plugged the last
major exit valve to the west and thereby stabilized the East German polity, but
it had also dealt another blow to the GDR’s prestige, regardless of all the propa-
ganda with which the East Berlin authorities tried to justify their actions.
Predictably, therefore, the East German government was obsessed with ques-
tions of legitimacy and prestige. Desperate to rid their country of its historically
inferior status as the Federal Republic’s pauper twin sister, East Berlin’s leaders
used every possible opportunity to emphasize and enhance the sovereignty and
stature of their German Democratic Republic as a normal state. In the course
of the 1960s, their efforts began to yield increasing dividends, as Bonn’s
Hallstein Doctrine slowly eroded and the East German state gradually gained in
economic and social stature. But the real turning point came in the early
1970s, with full-blown east-west détente and the launch of the new Ostpolitik
by Willy Brandt’s social-liberal coalition. During the first half of the 1970s, the
new political winds brought various new benefits to the GDR: widespread inter-
national recognition, United Nations membership, and—most promisingly—
far-reaching normalization of relations with the Federal Republic, although
Bonn still refused to recognize the GDR as a fully sovereign and separate state,
insisting that the German question remained open, with reunification as the ulti-
mate objective. With all these developments, the East German government had
more opportunities than ever to assert its sovereignty and prestige and thereby to
buttress its claim to political and popular legitimacy. It seized these chances in all
directions, bolstering its international diplomatic presence; trumpeting its eco-
nomic, technological, and social achievements; insisting on proper protocol
and correct terminology about the GDR and its sovereignty at every turn; and
launching cultural charm offensives, including impressive, doping-fueled sports
successes that promptly transformed the GDR into a veritable sporting
superpower.
East Berlin was eager to use the Weinhold case, too, to enhance its legitimacy.
In part, such efforts were very open and obvious, most notably in the extradition
63Karl F. Schumann, “Flucht und Ausreise aus der DDR insbesondere im Jahrzehnt ihres
Unterganges,” in Enquete-Kommission. Band V/3. Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und
internationale Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Deutscher Bundestag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995),
2359–2405.
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requests that the East German side kept pressing vis-à-vis the Federal Republic.
Although East Berlin’s authorities must have realized early on that their
demands would not be met, they stuck to their guns throughout the West
German judicial proceedings, with the goal of underscoring the normalcy of
the GDR as a respectable Rechtsstaat equal or indeed superior to West
Germany, and legally fully separate from it. The language in which the East
German authorities couched their demands highlighted these objectives.
Weinhold’s extradition was repeatedly portrayed as being “consistent with stan-
dard international legal norms” in the interaction between “two sovereign
states.”64
A more subtle and interesting East German strategy was the mirror-imaging
evident in much of the effort to instrumentalize the Weinhold case to score
points against the Federal Republic in reverse, on public relations terrain tra-
ditionally occupied by the west. Although détente had opened new avenues
for the GDR’s legitimacy-building campaigns, it had also demanded a price. It
had tied the GDR more closely to the wider international community and its
declared norms, such as the individual human right of freedom of movement,
and it had exposed the country to increasingly open competition with the west
in general and the Federal Republic in particular. In this context, East
Germany was vulnerable to attack on several issues, such as its repressive internal
practices, the most glaring of which was the denial of its citizens’ freedom of
movement embodied by its heavily militarized border regime, particularly
vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. The Weinhold case offered tantalizing opportu-
nities for East Berlin to try to turn the tables on its chief rival in this area of
great political and popular sensitivity, and the GDR authorities did their best
to seize these chances.
In part, the East German efforts focused on trying to reverse established western
discourses about violence at the inter-German frontier. To counter long-standing
western denunciations of its brutal border policies and of the Schiessbefehl that
supposedly underpinned them, East Berlin now hurled similar accusations at
Bonn. According to East German commentators, Weinhold’s lenient treatment
in the Federal Republic and his de facto “canonization into a hero of freedom”
there were “deeply immoral.”65 They showed that West German authorities
were prepared to allow “any criminal action . . . as long as it [was] directed
against the GDR or another socialist country.”66 West German official reactions
in general and the outcome of the Essen trial in December 1976 in particular pro-
vided an invitation for “murderers and other criminal elements” to appropriate
64See, for example, “Keine Zweifel an Verbrechen Weinholds,” Berliner Zeitung, June 11, 1976;
“Eine ungerechtfertigte Milde,” ND, December 12, 1978.
65“Wo nackter Mord legalisiert wird,” ND, June 17, 1976.
66“UZ: Freibrief für Gewalt bis hin zum brutalen Mord,” ND, June 11, 1976.
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“the overused notion of free movement” for the homicidal purpose of “declaring
open season on our border guards.”67 Similarly, the idea of self-defense in the
border zone, which in prevailing western narratives had been associated with
the attempts of fleeing refugees to duck bullets, mines, and other mortal
dangers, sometimes through the use of counterviolence, now received a very
different spin in East German commentary. Weinhold’s efforts to rationalize his
actions as self-defense were dismissed as “defamation and slander,” and a promi-
nent East German TV personality accused the Federal Republic of perverting self-
defense into a general authorization for “the murder of soldiers of the National
People’s Army (NVA).”68 Overall, the GDR sought to accuse the Federal
Republic of operating a kind of sinister Schiessbefehl of its own while describing
its own border enforcement policies as something entirely normal, indistinguish-
able from those applied in any other “civilized states.”69
East Berlin also tried to reverse the Federal Republic’s attacks against it on another,
more elevated level: that of national and international legal and humanitarian norms.
This had traditionally been an area of great vulnerability for the GDR, with many of
its practices routinely denounced on the other side of the IronCurtain as flagrant vio-
lations of individualized, western-style human rights. Such vulnerability had
increased with the advance of détente. By joining the United Nations in 1973,
the GDR had accepted the UN definition of freedom of travel as a human right,
and by becoming a signatory to the final act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 (also known as the Helsinki Accords after
the city in which they were signed), it had committed itself to promoting various
humanitarian principles, such as freer movement of people and ideas across national
boundaries, particularly across the east-west divide. With such concrete commit-
ments, and with the regular, multilateral monitoring of the signatories’ compliance
with their promises that the CSCE process also provided, the East Germans faced
pronounced and sustained public criticism of the contradictions between their
formal commitments and actual practices, most glaringly on the freedom of move-
ment issue.70 Critics in the Federal Republic and elsewhere routinely denounced
the GDR as a persistent violator of international agreements and human rights,
with much of their ire directed against the country’s militarized border regime, par-
ticularly vis-à-vis West Germany. A typical statement issued by the Bonn
67“Freizügigkeit für Mörder?,”ND, June 12, 1976; “Proteste gegen skandalöse Urteilssprechung in
der BRD,” Junge Welt, December 4, 1976.
68“Weinhold hat die Tat heimtückish geplant,” Berliner Zeitung, November 30, 1976; Karl Eduard
von Schnitzler, quoted in “Mörder als Held gefeiert,” Junge Welt, December 4, 1976.
69“Protokoll über die gerichtliche Beweiserhebung des 2. Strafsenats des Bezirksgerichts Dresden
vom 26. April 1978 bis zum 28. April 1978 auf Grund des Rechtshilfeersuches des
Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR vom 10. Februar 1978 in der Auslieferungsangelegenheit Werner
Weinhold,” BAL: DP 2, 2223.
70See, for example, Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds.,Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation
of Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2008).
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government in summer 1976, for example, exhorted the GDR’s rulers to remember
that “human rights [were] an essential element of détente” and that East Berlin was
therefore obliged to create “humane . . . conditions at the [inter-German] border.”71
The Weinhold incident allowed the GDR to launch a concentrated counter-
offensive against these accusations, and the attempt to cast the Federal Republic as
the real culprit in trampling legal and humanitarian norms promptly became the
dominant element in East German public rhetoric about the case. As we have
seen, East Berlin repeatedly attacked its western rival for its alleged “flagrant vio-
lations of international law” on various fronts: its failure to extraditeWeinhold, its
refusal to abide by the terms of the German-German Basic Treaty of 1972 and to
respect “the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the GDR, and its utter
inability to provide just punishment for a brutal “double murderer.”72 In a
direct reversal of much of the critical rhetoric regularly directed at them, East
German commentators portrayed these alleged West German transgressions as
part of a broader pattern of deliberate anti-détente activity, aimed in the first
instance at undermining the recently signed Helsinki Accords.73 In its official nar-
rative, the GDR thereby waxed into the only proper “Rechtsstaat” on German
soil, whose lucky and grateful citizens could “barely comprehend” the dark
machinations rampant on the other side of the east-west frontier.74
The East German efforts to use the Weinhold case to turn the tables on their
western opponents in the Cold-War legitimacy battle did work, up to a point.
Their impact was probably strongest inside the GDR itself. To be sure, popular
opinion in an authoritarian system such as East Germany is difficult to assess,
given the paucity of reliable sources. In addition, many of the so-called popular
reactions to the Weinhold incident in the GDR, particularly the numerous and
widely publicized protest resolutions adopted by workplace collectives, were
very consciously organized and steered by the authorities. But it appears that
the case in general and its legal aftermath in particular did touch a nerve
among many East Germans. West German observers within the GDR under-
scored this point, describing reactions among both “functionaries and rank-
and-file citizens” as “intense” and arguing that the case’s biggest contribution
had been to increase popular “compassion” for “soldiers who guard the
thoroughly unloved border” vis-à-vis the Federal Republic.75
71West German governmental declaration of July 28, 1976, in Bulletin des Presse- und
Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 1976, 847.
72“Doppelmörder Weinhold in BRD weiter auf freiem Fuss,” ND, June 11, 1976; “Freizügigkeit
für Mörder,” ND, June 12, 1976; “Der Doppelmörder Weinhold gehört vor ein Gericht der DDR,”
ND, January 19, 1977.
73See, for example, the materials collated in Panorama DDR, Dokumentarische Information, “Ein
Urteil gegen die Entspannung,” December 1976, BAB: DP 3, 443.
74“Höchstes BRD-Gericht stellt sich vor den Doppelmörder Weinhold,” ND, August 25/26,
1983; “Empörung in der DDR über das unmenschliche Urteil in der BRD,”ND, December 6, 1976.
75“Wie zwei Grenzfälle fast zum Kalten Krieg wurden,” Vorwärts, June 24, 1976.
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TheGDR’s publicity campaigns alsomade a certain impact inWest Germany. As
we have seen, they provoked public soul-searching about the implications of some
long-standing western political and ideological precepts, such as an individual’s right
to freedom of movement, even across the east-west barrier. A case in point was a
much-cited article by one of the Federal Republic’s leading left-liberal journalists,
which stressed that Weinhold had not fired at a political “system” but rather at
“two young people,” both of them military draftees. Extrapolating further, this
commentator—much like the judges in the second Weinhold trial—concluded
that “freedom of movement cannot stretch to a point at which its realization
would endanger the freedom—and even the lives—of others.”76 In this fashion,
counterpoints to some well-established western tenets about the inter-German
Cold-War struggle circulated more widely than before in the Federal Republic,
thanks to the controversies unleashed by the GDR’s responses to the Weinhold
case. But the East German publicity offensive also provoked obverse reactions in
the Federal Republic, as conservative commentators reasserted long-established
arguments in an effort to deny public relations advances to the East Germans. A flag-
ship newspaper of the highly anticommunist Springer publishing concern, for
example, maintained that the GDR’s Schiessbefehl was really to blame for this par-
ticular tragedy, too, and that the accused in the Essen courtroom in December 1978
should have been not Weinhold but the entire criminal “SED regime.”77
Ultimately, however, the success of the GDR’s efforts remained strictly
limited. Although the publicity campaigns with their extensive mirror-imaging
did work up to a point, highlighting the interdependence and interconnectedness
of the two Germanies, they could not reverse the dominance of the more estab-
lished West German discourse about the inter-German border and its victims, at
least outside the socialist bloc. On this score, too, the rivalry between the two
German states was thus hardly one of equals. The long-standing asymmetry in
power and legitimacy between the two polities remained a fact even in the era
of détente, despite all the seeming gains in stature and prestige that the GDR
had recently achieved. In important ways, the situation was actually growing
worse for East Berlin in the mid-1970s, as the rising costs of détente policies, par-
ticularly in the field of expected human-rights concessions, became increasingly
evident. In the long run, the most glaring problems were to emerge precisely in
the area in which the East German authorities had tried—and failed—to reverse
the prevailing dynamics of competition between themselves and their western
archrivals during the Weinhold case: interpretations of the inter-German
border and the contested privilege of individual freedom of movement across it.
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